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Ordman: Fifty Years of the NLRA: An Overview

FIFTY YEARS OF THE NLRA: AN OVERVIEW
ARNOLD ORDMAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1935 a Wagner-Connery bill, sponsored by a Senator from New York and
a Congressman from Massachusetts, was enacted into law. It became the National
Labor Relations Act (the "Act" or "NLRA"). It granted employees the right to
organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
Industrial democracy was born.
The Act also created an agency, the National Labor Relations Board ("Board"),
to assure implementation of those declared rights. The Board was given two primary
functions: (1) to determine by conducting secret-ballot elections whether or not
employees wanted a union to represent them and (2) to prevent unfair labor practices, and to remedy them when they occurred.
In 1947, twelve years after its original enactment, the Act, then popularly known
as the Wagner Act, was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. Employers, for the first
time, were given statutory protection against unfair labor practices by unions. Additional protection was afforded employers in 1959 by the Landrum-Griffin
amendments.'
Fifty years have passed since enactment of the Act. Riven by controversy at
its birth, the NLRA still has its adherents and detractors, some more strident than
others. This is not surprising. Dispassionate appraisal is difficult in a field where
fair evaluations can be clouded not only by crucial economic and financial considerations, but also by socio-economic and political philosophies. And, it should
be at once conceded that categorical judgments are terribly vulnerable where so
many variable factors, both objective and subjective, coexist.
It is the purpose of this paper to recount briefly some of the economic and
political history of the Act, to demonstrate the volatility and the constantly changing nature of its subject matter, to list some achievements and some shortcomings
of the Act, and to deal with some popular criticisms and suggested reforms. The
author lays claims to no special insights other than those which might flow from
long and intimate exposure to the operations of the Act and to much of the personnel involved in its administration.
An overview is essential. It is too easy to get bogged down in details. Yet,
a half-century of experience should enable us to distinguish the forest from the trees.

* B.A. Boston University; LL.B., Harvard University, 1936. The author is a former two-term
General Counsel to the National Labor Relations Board, serving from 1963-1971. Presently, Mr. Ordman
serves as a labor arbitrator.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-187 (1982).
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A HALF-CENTURY OF PROGRESS

Laments to the contrary notwithstanding, hindsight compels the conclusion that
remarkable progress has been made in the American industrial arena. We tend to
forget our history. In the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early decades
of the present century, the American industrial worker was ruthlessly exploited.
He rebelled. But the rebellion was quelled, frequently with the aid of Government.
Throughout those years the American labor scene was often a sordid spectacle of
violence, rioting, demonstrations, and sit-ins. The use of armed guards, police,
and the military was an all too familiar phenomenon. It was hardly a flattering
commentary when fifteen years ago, in a carefully documented study, two professors revealed that there had been more violence and bloodshed in American labor
history than in any other labor movement in the world.'
This history goaded the conscience of the country and finally impelled Congress to enact remedial legislation. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 capped
a series of federal statutes which endowed industrial workers with certain basic
rights.3 The NLRA expressly enunciated some of these rights and created a machinery
to enforce them.
More than a legislative declaration was needed, however. Like other social
legislation of the early New Deal, the Act was not enthusiastically welcomed in
all quarters. Its constitutionality was attacked-indeed, respected legal authorities
of that decade questioned its constitutionality-injunctive relief against the Board
was sought, and often obtained from, courts many of which looked askance at
what they perceived as burgeoning federal legislation impinging on private property
rights. Indeed, almost two years elapsed before the Supreme Court of the United
States declared the constitutionality of the Act, and then only by a one-vote margin.4
It would be comforting to report that resistance to the Act ceased with the
issuance of that decision. It did not. Even modest utopias are not readily brought
into being. Resistance to the purposes and policies of the Act is still manifest in
much of the Board's caseload. Indeed, hostile critics of the Act and the Board
often point to that caseload as proof that the Act has failed and that the Act should
be replaced or drastically revised. It merits only parenthetical note that this effort
has failed. Over a succession of political administrations neither the executive nor
the legislative branches of the Government has yielded to such demands. There
has been for the past twenty-five years no popular groundswell of support for
elimination or substantial reform of the Act. Advocacy for such action is largely
confined to narrow partisan interests or public relations outlets subsidized by those
interests.

I P. Taft & P. Ross, American Labor Violence, Its Causes, Characterand Outcome, in GRAHAM
& GuRR, HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1969).
' See Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982); Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
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The fact is that -the violence and bloodshed which characterized labor relations
more than fifty years ago is now virtually non-existent. Both management and labor
have matured. The rascals among them are few.
III. TBE BOARD'S CASELOAD
The size of the Board's caseload is regrettable. But even that picture is not
as bleak as some critics suggest. Everything must be seen in perspective. The great
majority of employers, the great majority of unions, comply with the law. They
do not appear before the Board. Thousands of collective bargaining relationships
exist without resort to Board procedures and thousands of collective bargaining
agreements have been executed and are operative without Board scrutiny. The short
of the matter is that the federal labor relations law is being observed. It is working.
But this information is not publicized. Good news rarely makes headlines.
Rather, headlines are made when the Board publicizes its caseload. At first glance,
the figures appear frightening. In the abstract, they would seem to reflect an industrial society run amok in its resistance to federal labor regulation. And even
otherwise careful observers sometimes jump to that conclusion. But the truth is
that, seen in context, the Board's caseload is minuscule when measured against
the vast number of employees, unions, and employing enterprises covered by the Act.
As already suggested, the Board's caseload is generated, for the most part,
by the relative few in the ranks of management and labor who either adamantly
reject the federal labor law or who, while ostensibly acknowledging the legitimacy
of that law, stubbornly resist its processes when those processes are brought to
bear against them. These offenders, frequently recidivists, do not, as a rule, raise
novel or complex issues. Their offenses for the most part consist of blatant interference with organizational freedom and outright discharges for union activity
on the part of management, and blatant violations on the part of unions. This
is the basic pattern of most of the Board's caseload: elementary and familiar violations by a small fraction of the labor and management communities.
A small portion of that caseload, however, arises from the very nature of the
subject matter being regulated. This was foreseeable. The past fifty years have been
a particularly dramatic era, not only in the development of national labor relations
law, but, more importantly, in the evolution of the economic, technical, and even
the corporate and union components of the industrial environment upon which
and in which that law operates.
Few areas of contemporary legislative, administrative, and judicial action react
more sensitively or more responsively to the push and pull of socio-economic forces.
The changing industrial patterns, national and now international, constantly evoke
new problems to which the Board procedures as well as the detailed provisions
of the Act must be applied. Even problems which apparently have already been
resolved sometimes take on a different format because the economic matrix from
which they emerged has itself been significantly altered. Thus, the Act, in its brief
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wars and threats of war, inflation, deflation, high and low employment and
unemployment ratios, the impact of competition from resurgent industrialization
overseas, bursts of technological advancement (including the computer era), dramatic
changes in union and management structure, affiliations and disaffiliations in the
trade union movement, corporate mergers and conglomerates, and a vibrant civil
rights movement with a concomitant emphasis on fair representation and seniority
issues. Small wonder, then, that the Board's caseload reflects these problems.
It follows that one prophecy can safely be made. Never will all labor relations
problems be solved. The Board, so long as it exists, will never run out of work.
This may be scant solace to the employees, employers, and unions who seek stability
in their relationships and predictability in their obligations and benefits. But
economic change and economic progress exact a cost, and that cost must be paid.
The situation is not wholly disheartening. History, even recent history, teaches
us that there is a reservoir of ingenuity and goodwill in the ranks of labor and
management. Confronted with a common problem, they can and do pool their
efforts to come up with solutions. Thereby, they document a postulate too often
forgotten: more often than not, governments do not solve problems; people do.
Illustrative instances abound. Management and labor, without resort to the Board
or the processes of the Act, have repeatedly and successfully resolved crises with
which they have been confronted.
IV.

Ti

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Is NOT
A SELF-ENERGIZING AGENCY

Also too often forgotten by the Board's critics is the fact that the Board is
not a self-energizing agency. It initiates no actions and generates no programs. To
the extent it has rule-making powers, it has sedulously, and perhaps erroneously,
refrained from exercising those powers. In practice, therefore, the Board asserts
its jurisdictions and exercises its statutory powers only if and when its processes
are invoked by the private parties who invoke those processes.
That is as it should be. Only scant references need be made to the Act or to
its legislative history to document the case. Congress did not create the Board as
an agency to mandate to management and labor the terms of their relationships.
Congress did not create an industrial dictatorship; it fostered an industrial
democracy. Congress recognized that management and labor are free institutions
in a free society. It was desired and expected that labor and management would
resolve their own problems and fashion their own relationships. The Board could
help the parties get to the door of the bargaining conference room if the parties
so desired. Once the parties are at that door, the Board must leave. Each of the
parties can utilize its own economic strength to attain the bargain it seeks.
To be sure, rules were set down. The right of employees to have the freedom
to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing was guaranteed. Neither management nor labor could trample upon these rights.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss1/5
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Unfair labor practices by both management and labor were proscribed. Within these
limits a fair fight was contemplated and allowed. Management and labor could
battle for the allegiance of the employees. Rival unions could vie for the employees'
allegiance. If labor could capture the allegiance of the employees, it could bargain
on their behalf. Management could resist what it deemed to be inordinate union
demands. Out of this contest a collective bargaining agreement could and almost
invariably does emerge.
This was and is the congressional plan. And that plan has been fulfilled.
V.

AN OvERvmw

Critics of the Act and the Board have been legion over the years. Admission
to that legion is not limited. A bit of bias is not a detriment to admission. Some
would even consider it an asset.
Also, expertise is apparently not required. After all, everyone knows a lot about
labor relations. And the critics may even have been involved in a labor relations
dispute in one capacity or another. Besides, the communications media, including
newspapers, magazines, television, and radio, have given ample, albeit sometimes
inaccurate and disjointed, coverage to labor relations disputes. What more is needed?
This is not to suggest that all critics of the Act fall in this category. But many,
hostile and laudatory critics alike, do. Also there are those who may be described
as institutional critics. These are individuals who, either in a personal or in a
representative capacity, are the spokespersons for either labor or management, and
bespeak the interests of their particular group. This does not, of course, demonstrate
that their views or opinions are invalid. They may be quite germane and accurate.
But a modest reserve before accepting those views or opinions is warranted.
Moreover, enough has been said to establish that the subject matter here is
more complex than might appear to an unsophisticated observer. Not all the flaws
and blemishes in the physiognomy of labor relations are attributable to the Board.
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Garner v. Teamsters Union,5 much of the
area of labor combat was designed by Congress to be free.
In the limited role which Congress did assign to the Board, its performance,
as we have noted, has been quite creditable. But even on a generous appraisal,
shortcomings must be acknowledged. As already mentioned, much of the Board's
caseload arises from offenders who stubbornly resist and repudiate federal intrusion into what they regard as their exclusive private domain. Perhaps more statutory
provisions should be afforded to meet this problem, but that relief is not readily
available. As all parties are painfully aware, the road to statutory amendment is
a rocky one.

I Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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Critics suggest that there is an easy method available to abate the Board's caseload: limit the Board's jurisdiction to exclude many small enterprises not deserving
of national attention. But, as is sometimes the case where facile remedies are suggested, statutory roadblocks may be overlooked or inadequately considered. Thus,
section 14(c)(1) of the Act does provide that the Board may, in its discretion, decline
to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employees where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute
on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction.
However, an important provision is added to section 14(c)(1) limiting the language
which some critics find so alluring. The proviso reads that the Board "shall not
decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.116
Obviously, the statute limits the feasibility or legality of Board action, delimiting
the exercise of its jurisdiction. But this is not the only drawback. The proposed
change would concededly eliminate a large proportion of the cases which form the
bulk of the Board caseload. But what would this achieve? A large proportion of
offenders who consciously and deliberately flout the legislation would be let off
the hook. They could gleefully smirk at their more conscientious and law-abiding
colleagues who comply with the Act. More importantly, the right of the employee
in the small enterprise seems no less worthy of consideration than the right of the
employee in the large enterprise. The American employee is less anchored to his
particular employing enterprise than his European or Japanese counterpart. Are
we to inform him that his statutory rights are endangered if he elects to work for
a smaller enterprise?
And at what cost? If the right to organize and bargain collectively is denied
to any segment of the work force, the integrity of the administrative machinery
is, pro tanto, impugned and the legislative purpose frustrated. This is the road
to regression. We want no return to pre-1935 industrial relations patterns.
Another suggestion of critics, hardly novel, is to transfer certain functions of
the Board to the courts. More specifically, this suggestion generally takes the form
that the Board should retain the function of handling elections but that the function
of prosecuting and deciding unfair labor practice cases should be turned over to
federal district attorneys and federal district courts. Again, I make only brief
reference to the fact that this also calls for a major statutory overhaul.
And this suggested reform calls attention to another paradox. Invariably, the
suggestion that courts be assigned the unfair labor practice function finds itself
in company with the criticism that the Board, which has been handling the unfair
labor practice function, lacks knowledge of industrial life and the practical workings
of collective bargaining. That some Board members may over the years have been

6

National Labor Relations Act § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1982).
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vulnerable to this criticism is undoubtedly true, but no one has demonstrated that
judicial appointees carry superior, or even equivalent, qualifications in this regard.
In addition, it only belabors the obvious to point out that the litigational delays
(for which the Board is responsible at least in part, for which the Board can properly be criticized, and for which the Board should make more than surface efforts
to remedy) would be severely aggravated if the Board's substantial caseload were
superimposed on the heavy dockets which the courts already carry and about which
they vehemently complain.
Court review serves an admirable function. But it serves that function eminently
in its review of Board orders as presently provided in the Act.
Nor would there appear to be merit in the suggestion that the office of the
General Counsel be abolished. Just as there is nothing in the nature of a judicial
appointee that renders him better qualified than a Board appointee to pass on unfair labor practices, so a district attorney possesses no special attributes to assure
superior performance in this area. Indeed, if at all, there is a prejudicial factor.
The General Counsel has unreviewable power not to prosecute an unfair labor practice case. The district attorney would have that power also, and his motivation
in the regard would be increased immeasurably by the twin objective of reducing
his own caseload. I consider that unfortunate.
Indeed, years of direct experience and reflection persuade me that unreviewable
discretion in the office of General Counsel to dismiss unfair labor practice charges
is undemocratic, autocratic, and plain wrong in the first instance. Even internal
review procedures designed to assure independent reappraisal of such dismissals
are inadequate. No such power should be granted to a single individual in the labor
relations area. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has so far not challenged-indeed,
it has apparently recognized-the final authority of the General Counsel in this
regard. I am satisfied, however, that given the proper case, the Supreme Court
will rule to the contrary.
The question of who shall review the General Counsel's action of dismissal
is more difficult. The Board should not be given that authority. Such a grant of
authority would truly abolish the separation between the prosecutorial and judicial
function for which the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act
so wisely provided. Despite the greatest of reluctance, I would assign the review
power to the federal district courts with the hope that the authority would be sparingly and scrupulously exercised.
There are other suggested changes with which I am not unsympathetic. One
of these is that the Board's remedies have become too mechanical; that they are,
in important respects, ineffective; and that the Board can devise remedies which
are more effective in view of the broad statutory authority to "take such affirmative
action . . .as will effectuate the policies of this Act."" Too often, government
I National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
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agencies and departments, as they grow older, suffer from hardening of the arteries.
The zeal and the imagination which marked their early efforts fade away. The philosophy of "we've always done it this way" takes over. The fact that the old way
may have become inadequate because of changing circumstances is disregarded.
The well-worn path is easier to follow. I suggest that emphasis on more effective
remedies would bring substantial dividends. In that connection, a review of Board
procedures overall would not be amiss. In large part, those procedures have
undergone little change since they were evolved by early Board pioneers.
A better public relations program would be in order. The Board should not
be reluctant to assert the progress that has been made in the industrial relations
arena. More importantly, the Board should make known its limitations. It is not
a self-energizing agency. It was not created to impose management's view on labor,
or labor's view on management. Yet, in essence, that is what certain of the strident
voices in management and in labor are really seeking. That is what they are really
complaining about. They do not want a neutral agency.
This underlies the recurrent cry, sometimes from management, sometimes from
labor, that the Board is too political. Translated into plainer terms, the complaint
is that the Board is deciding too many cases in favor of management, or in favor
of labor, as the case may be.
It must be acknowledged that this criticism goes in cycles, that in liberal administrations it is management that complains; in conservative administrations labor
complains.
But candor compels the admission that the complaint here is not wholly without
substance. Ideally, this should be a government of laws, and not of men. But the
unyielding reality is that administrators and adjudicators are men. Both appointing
authorities and appointees have philosophies and orientations. Yet, men and women
of integrity, in the discharge of their administrative and judicial function, resist
the intrusion of their personal convictions when a question of legal interpretation
is involved.
I believe this effort has been largely successful at the Board as at other administrative and quasi-judicial agencies. I would not deny that there has been, at different times and in differing degrees, a political impact on the Board's decisional
processes. But I also believe that impact has been minimal. Moreover, the healthy
restraint of appellate court review tends to preclude too violent swings ifi the direction of either management or labor.
Finally, I am aware of no complete solution to the problem. There is little
reason to assume that district court judges are immune to political influences. Life
tenure is suggested as a palliative here. But Supreme Court Justices also have life
tenure and even that august tribunal is not immune to criticism that it is making
political judgments. One significant advantage would be forfeited, however, by
transfer of Board jurisdiction to the district courts. Whatever its shortcomings,
labor relations law is laid down in the first instance by a single agency with nation- 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss1/5
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wide jurisdiction. A uniform code of law is established. Will the labor relations
picture be improved by entrusting the interpretation and application of the Act
in the first instance to several hundred independent district court judges? I think not.
Not all criticisms of the Act and of Board processes have been listed here.
Not all suggestions for Board reform have been here enumerated. But the criticisms
here listed and the reform measures here enumerated should furnish ground for
closer scrutiny of criticisms and reform measures not itemized here.
There is no intent to suggest here that the Board is immune to criticism and
that neither the Act nor the Board's processes are susceptible to improvement. That
is certainly not the case.
But remarkable progress has been made in American industrial relations. Some
of that progress is attributable to the Board. By the same token, there are still
major problems which remain unsolved and the Board is not wholly free of blame
in that regard.
As pointed out at the outset, the Board was given two principal functions to
perform: (1) to conduct elections for the selection of a bargaining representative
if the employees so desire and (2) to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices.
Essentially and ideally, the second function should be ancillary and subordinate
to the first. That ideal has not been realized. The function of conducting elections
has operated admirably. But a dwindling of the unfair labor practice caseload has
not occurred. It still consumes most of the Board's time and resources.
This was not foreseen by the framers of the Act. They did not anticipate the
stubborn resistance displayed by a small minority of the labor-management community to the processes of the Act. Nor did they anticipate the dramatic changes
in the labor relations arena which would come to the cynosure of the Board.
For the Board, finding the answers to these problems was not and is not an
easy task. The Board's freedom of action in this regard is tightly circumscribed
by the statutory framework in which it operates. The Board's task would also be
considerably lightened if, in bringing these problems to the Board and addressing
them, labor spoke with a single voice and management with a single voice. Even
then, the Board would have to be concerned with the often unarticulated public
interest and the often unarticulated interest of the employee qua employee.
Yet, with increasing frequency, neither management nor labor speaks with a
single voice. The interests of the large corporation often do not coincide with the
interests of the small businessman and there are even differences within these separate
groups. The divergent views among labor organizations, aggregates of labor
organizations, and even within particular labor organizations is also familiar to
informed observers. Predictably, business and labor are subject to and react to
the forces of the marketplace.
But problems before the Board are not insoluble. In due course they will be
solved.
They
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Disseminated
by will
The be
Research
@ WVU, 1985

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 5
24

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

their energies, and their goodwill. Criticism should not cease. It is often warranted.
Recommendations for changes should continue but with the caveat that such recommendations should be constructive.
Most importantly, the Board itself, collectively and as an aggregate of individuals, together with the General Counsel, must never forget that their mission
is, not to implement their own views, but the policies and procedures of the Act
they were appointed to administer. That Act has over the years served the nation
well. May it continue to do so.
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